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Introduction: Enlightenment in discussion
Wessel Stoker
Light and enlightenment are symbolic of life and salvation. This is true of 
both Hebrew and Greek thinking. These two streams of thought merge in the 
Jewish Hellenistic philosopher Philo. In Neoplatonism, enlightenment and 
knowledge are closely linked, and the term enlightenment refers to a 
mystical ecstatic contemplation of light. A religious understanding of the 
symbol of enlightenment is also found in the concept of ‘Sophia’ in the 
thinking of Russian Orthodox philosophers such as Solovyov and Florensky.  
In the West, in the modern period, the term ‘enlightenment’ is primarily 
understood as a secular one, generally referring to a period in history, 
roughly speaking the eighteenth century. The emergence of the natural 
sciences gave rise, in (Western) Europe, to a feeling of optimism about a 
better life for mankind, and thus a belief in progress. In this way, 
‘Enlightenment’ became the name for the cultural philosophical, religious 
and political programme of enlightened philosophers. This programme 
comprises independent thought, criticism, tolerance and progress, as well as 
the political translation of these ideals into a new rule of law, free of 
censorship by church or sovereign, in which the individual is free to express 
his or her opinion.  
In 2004, the European Society for the Philosophy of Religion devoted its 
periodic conference to the Enlightenment and religion, ‘enlightenment’ being 
understood in its modern meaning: the Enlightenment as a historical period 
and a programme. How is the project of the Enlightenment continued? What 
alternatives are there in the modern day to the thinking of the 
Enlightenment? Are there also post-Enlightenment examples of thinking 
determined by the philosophy of religion?  The present volume comprises the 
papers presented at the conference about enlightenment and religion; these 
contributions have been reworked in the light of the lively discussions at the 
conference, and subsequent comments from the editors. Although many 
more themes could have been included, the editors were of the opinion that 
2the lack of an article on Habermas was a serious omission, so that want has 
now been supplied.
By way of an introduction, there follows a short discussion about the 
Enlightenment as a period, a movement and a programme, outlining the way 
in which the various authors of this volume take the term ‘enlightenment’ as 
their point of reference. A brief overview is then given of the individual 
articles.    
1. The Enlightenment as a period and a movement   
The Enlightenment, when referring to a period in history, more-or-less 
exactly coincides with the eighteenth century. It is generally taken to begin 
with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the writings of Locke (1632-1704) 
and Bayle (1647-1706), and to end with the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776), the French Revolution (1789) or the fall of post-
revolutionary France (1815), and the reaction of Romanticism. Precisely in 
connection with the philosophy of religion, which has its roots in the 
Enlightenment, I would point to a forerunner, Herbert of Cherbury (1582-
1648), who is often called the father of Deism.1 By the very nature of the 
matter, no terminus can be given for the Enlightenment as a programme. 
One could point to nineteenth-century thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, but 
the programme of the Enlightenment is picked up again and again in new 
forms, not only by twentieth-century sociologists such as Luhmann and 
Habermas, but also by Derrida. 
The origins of enlightened thinking in terms of the philosophy of religion 
lie in the days of the religious disputes between Catholics and Protestants. 
Herbert of Cherbury was in Holland at the time of the Remonstrant conflicts. 
In France, too, where he was the English ambassador, he experienced 
religious conflict. His contribution, from the point of view of the philosophy 
of religion, to solving these religious conflicts was to develop the concept of 
natural religion. In this endeavour, he transformed natural theology into 
natural religion. In his De Veritate (1624), he outlined the five universal 
truths of natural religion: there is one God above all (supreme Deity) (1); this 
God must be worshipped (2); this occurs through piety and virtue, not 
through rites (3); by nature, human beings are repelled by their own 
                                      
1 This judgement is under dispute; see D.A. Pailin, Herbert von Cherbury, Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie Studienausgabe Teil I , Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1986, XV, 65. 
3depravity (4); one should repent and atone for one’s misdeeds (4); reward 
and punishment will take place in the afterlife (5).   
In his De Religione Laici (1645), Herbert of Cherbury, in his own way, 
practises what Kant (1724-1804) would later describe as the programme of 
the Enlightenment, i.e. “in Religionsdingen sich ihres eigenen Verstandes 
ohne Leitung eines Andern sicher und gut zu bedienen”.2 Herbert of 
Cherbury addresses the question of how a lay person can, through prayer 
and reason, reach an independent decision when it comes to choosing the 
right religion. How can a traveller in this world (viator) distinguish between 
truth and error? Since the revelation of positive religion is firmly anchored in 
history, it can only lay claim to probability, not to certainty. Instead of 
authoritative faith, belief in the authority of a church or tradition, Herbert of 
Cherbury posits that faith must be justified by reason. Religion as passed 
down through history is valid insofar as it is not at variance with reason. In 
his De Veritate, he demonstrates that natural religion is self-evident for 
human beings. For the philosophers of the eighteenth century, natural 
religion became the yardstick for revealed religion.
The Enlightenment began in England. In Locke and the English Deists, we 
already encounter Enlightenment themes, such as tolerance, independent 
thought and the right to form one’s own judgement. In his A Discourse of 
Free-Thinking (1713), the English Deist Anthony Collins (1676-1729) speaks 
up for the right to free thinking as independent thought. English Deists such 
as Collins and Thomas Woolston (1670-1733) disputed the historical validity 
of miracles and prophecies which the theologians of the Anglican church 
adduced as evidence for the Christian faith. Such thinkers had little regard 
for the rituals and dogmas of the church, as is evident from John Toland’s 
(1670-1722) Christianity not Mysterious (1696). Natural religion was seen as 
the alternative to positive, historically developed, religion. Another English 
Deist, Matthew Tindal (1657-1733), defended the idea of an autonomous 
morality, an morality independent of biblical revelation. From England, this 
enlightened thinking spread to France and Germany.
In the present volume, the German thinkers of the Enlightenment, such 
as Lessing (1729-1881) and Kant (1724-1804), receive a great deal of 
attention, and for that reason I will outline their position within the 
eighteenth century as a whole. Especially when offset against the English 
                                      
2 Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung, Kants Werke, Akademie-Textausgabe, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1968-1977, VIII, 40 (What is Enlightenment?) 
4Deists such as Toland and Tindal, and the German Deist Hermann Samuel 
Reimarus (1694-1786), Lessing and Kant’s position with regard to history 
and positive religion emerges with greater clarity. 
The Deist context of Lessing’s and Kant’s philosophy of religion3
Locke’s statement that “Reason must be our last guide in everything”4 can be 
taken as a motto for many ‘enlightened thinkers’. This statement makes 
Locke a prime exponent of rationalism. Rationalism is here not understood 
epistemologically as the doctrine of innate concepts as opposed to 
empiricism, but rather as an attitude of mind founded on independent 
thought and judgement, free of sovereign, church or tradition. Many 
eighteenth-century enlightened thinkers believed that reason was uniform, 
and could thus serve as a universal yardstick. The way in which this 
principle was developed by the various thinkers differed considerably, as is 
shown by a comparison between Deists such as Tindal and Reimarus on the 
one hand, and (the later) Lessing and Kant, on the other hand. I shall 
demonstrate this using the example of their understanding of history.  
Deism has been described as “on the basis of free investigation founded 
on thinking, elevating natural religion to the norm and rule for all positive 
religion”.5 The Deists believed that reason could solve all life’s great 
questions. They viewed Christianity as ‘not mysterious’, because every 
human being should be able to understand religion. Thus Tindal writes: “To 
suppose it dark and mysterious in any Part, is to represent it as unworthy of 
having God for its Author”.6  In his historico-critical study, the Apologie oder 
Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes (Apology or defence for the 
rational worshippers of God) (1791), Reimarus attempts to demonstrate that 
Jesus preached a religion free of mystery. 
The Deists were convinced of the uniformity and changelessness of 
reason. The natural order of things (the ‘Reason and Nature of Things’7) is 
valid always and everywhere as the norm for all actions. Living in accordance 
                                      
3 See for a comparison between the philosophy of religion of the Deists, Lessing and Kant: 
W. Stoker, De christelijke godsdienst in de filosofie van de Verlichting, een vergelijkende 
studie over de geloofsverantwoording in het denken van Locke, de deïsten, Lessing en Kant, 
Assen: Van Gorcum 1980.   
4 J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser, New York: Dover 
Pubications 1959, 4.19.14.
5 G.V. Lecher, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, (Tübingen 1841), Hildesheim: Ol,s, 1965, 
460, E. Troeltsch, Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie, (Tübingen 1925) 
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6 M. Tindal, Christianity als Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion 
of Nature, London 1730, ed.G. Gawlick, Stuttgart: Frommann 1967, 223. 
5with nature means obeying an unchanging and universal norm. New ethical 
or religious views are rated negatively as an alteration to that which nature 
teaches always and everywhere. Due to this belief in the uniformity of reason 
and nature, the Deists’ perspective on history can be characterized as 
primitivism. By this I mean that the Deists held that the truths of natural 
religion were preserved most purely in the very earliest times. The title of 
Tindal’s book expresses this in a nutshell: Christianity as Old as the 
Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature (1730). He 
posits that Christianity is as old as creation because he believes that each 
human being, through reason, has known natural religion (which Tindal 
identified with Christianity) from the beginning of time. For the Deists, not 
only does religion have its philosophical foundations in reason, but they also 
assume that religion is, by nature, proper to the human being. The ‘Gospel a 
Republication of the Religion of Nature’ purges religion of the sediments 
which have built up over the years, such as mysteries and ceremonies, and 
liberates us from “that Load of Superstition which has been mixed with it”8. 
What primitivism amounts to, thus, is that despite the changing times, there 
is nothing new under the sun.
Deists are often determinate for the image of the Enlightenment. 
Troeltsch and Gawlick call Deism the philosophy of religion of the 
Enlightenment.9 But that is too one-sided. Lessing and Kant give new 
insights. They retain rationalism as an attitude of independent thought, and 
they too certainly view reason as uniform, but unlike Tindal and Reimarus, 
they do succeed in linking religion and history. The image of the 
Enlightenment would be even more colourful, I would point out in passing, 
were we to dwell for a moment on Hume, Rousseau or Herder. In her article, 
Richter correctly refers to the colourfulness of the Enlightenment. In line 
with the focus of the articles in this volume, however, I will here confine 
myself to Lessing and Kant. 
Lessing’s departure from the Deist philosophy of history 
It was only with difficulty that Lessing could extricate himself from the 
negative philosophy of history, primitivism. In 1743, he wrote his father a 
                                                                                                                       
7 Tindal, Christianity als Old as the Creation, 13.
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6New-Year’s greeting with the title: ‘Glückwunschungsrede, bey dem Eintritt 
des 1743sten Jahrs, von der Gleichheit eines mit dem andern’ 
(Congratulatory address to mark the beginning of the 1743rd year, on the 
similarity of each with the other). As is shown even by the title, Lessing tends 
to believe that in fact there is no change, that all times are the same. A sense 
of historical development is entirely lacking here. Time is still viewed as one 
great present, in which there is no past or future.10 Years later, Lessing 
seems to have freed himself from this perspective on history. In Education of 
Humanity (1781), he defends the Christian religion against the Deist 
Reimarus, who disputed that history was a suitable medium for divine 
revelation. Lessing gives an alternative view. He depicts history as a 
teleological process of development in which human beings are educated by 
virtue of revelation. Lessing depicts the pedagogical process from the end, 
looking back. Standing on a height, Lessing states that for the human being 
of today, religious truth is still ‘a revealed truth’, but one day religious truth 
will be open to insight by reason and obtainable without revelation. 
The articles by Grube and Geldhof in this volume evaluate Lessing’s 
concept of history differently. This has to do with the perspective from which 
each of them discusses his concept of history. We have seen that in 
confrontation with the Deist Reimarus (and in this sense Spinoza is also a 
Deist), Lessing makes an attempt to link history and revelation with one 
another, and has here moved away from his earlier Deist, ahistorical 
standpoint. By virtue of revelation, first in the Old, and later in the New 
Testament, man arrives at religious insight. Lessing anticipates a time when 
man will no longer have to rely on revelation, but will be able to attain this
natural religion  for himself. We can see the major difference from the Deist 
view of Tindal and Reimarus: insight into religious truth is not ‘as old as 
creation’ and eternal, but rather develops by virtue of history, which is 
understood as a process of divine pedagogy. Grube, in his explanation of 
Lessing’s parable of the rings (1779), emphasizes above all the historical 
rootedness of religion. If one compares Lessing’s understanding of history 
with that of Schelling, a different aspect of Lessing’s approach to history 
comes to the fore. Geldhof  shows that Lessing’s understanding of history is 
more speculative than that of Schelling, since in his thinking the framework 
of interpretation strongly determines the historical details.
                                      
10 See for the philosophical background of the idea of history in Lessing: W.Stoker, De 
christelijke godsdienst in de filosofie van de Verlichting, 83f.
7Kant and Deism  
Kant picks up his contemporaries’ themes from the philosophy of religion, 
such as independent thought, natural religion, autonomous morality and 
tolerance, and reformulates them on a large scale in his critical philosophy. 
Since in his thinking reason is subject to self-criticism, and natural religion 
cannot withstand criticism, it is no longer a question of a religion derived 
from theoretical reason, but a religion derived from practical reason. In Kant, 
the concept of God becomes a transcendental idea of theoretical reason and 
a postulate of practical reason. Moral law, as a law derived from practical 
reason, replaces the Deist view of a natural law according to which nature is 
the norm for all activity. As was said above, Kant too retains the idea of 
uniformity which we encounter in the Deists, but gives it a different content. 
Independent thinking is reasonable thinking if it is thinking which has 
generally validity. He understands the thinking self as the transcendental 
subject which is common to all human beings. With the Deists, Kant shares 
the view that only that which is based on reason can be universal. For this 
reason he explains the Christian religion as a moral religion.11 And the place 
of religion in history? Kant does not revert to the negative philosophy of 
history of Deists such as Tindal and Reimarus. Like Lessing, he believes that 
natural religion  cannot come about without positive religion.
The importance of history, and thus of positive or revealed religion, for 
natural religion emerges clearly if one reads the third part of Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone (1793; henceforth Religion) from the point of view 
of Kant’s philosophy of history. This philosophy depicts history as a 
development towards liberty and rationalism. Kant describes the formation 
of states in which liberty, and protection under the rule of law are possible. 
The subject of reciprocal relations between states also draws his attention in 
Perpetual Peace (1795), in which he advocates a cosmopolitical order. The 
emergence of the rule of law furthers Enlightenment12: the rights of each 
individual are protected and the climate is suitable for free thinking. The 
maxim of always thinking for oneself is the Enlightenment.13 Constraint from 
the state, which would prevent us from bringing our thoughts into the open, 
is in conflict with this ideal. 
                                      
11 Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, Werke VII, 67 (The Strife of Faculties); Die Religion 
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Werke VI, 155-157 (Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone. Tr. T.Greene and H.H.Hudson: New York Harper Bros, 1960, IV, 1.1).
12 Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Werke VIII, 
27v (Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View).
8In the third part of Religion, Kant poses the question of the conditions 
under which the realization of the highest good, as the ethical 
commonwealth of human beings on earth, is possible. In his striving for 
moral perfection, the individual will always be thwarted by the fact that he 
lives in society, surrounded by the malice, envy, and thirst for power of his 
fellows. The conversion of the individual is not enough, because he is 
frustrated in his search for the highest good by his contact with others. Yet, 
according to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, it is the duty of each human 
being to strive for the highest good. How can these impediments be 
overcome? This is possible, in Kant’s view, if each individual views himself as 
a part of humanity as a whole, and understands the highest good as the 
common good; the individual can only achieve moral perfection within a 
community of like-minded others. Humanity is under an obligation to itself 
to further the highest good as the common good.14 Just as the ‘judicial state 
of nature’ must be replaced by the formation of a state based on the rule of 
law, the ‘ethical state of nature’ must be replaced by the setting up of a 
kingdom of virtue, a republic in which people obey moral laws.15 But is this 
sufficient, if man is radically evil, as Kant believes?
In her article in this volume, Schaafsma points to Kant’s theme of 
radical evil. Radical evil is the reason why Kant views the establishment of 
an ethical commonwealth as a superhuman endeavour, in which human 
beings must rely on God. Human beings are simply not up to the task. How 
can an ethical commonwealth of this kind ever come about? How can one 
expect something pure out of impure beings, or “something perfectly straight 
…out of such crooked wood”?16 Here the pale God as a postulate of practical 
reason acquires more colour. Working to achieve an ethical commonwealth
is meaningless without belief in God as the founder and inspiration behind 
it. The obligation to work towards an ethical commonwealth of mankind 
presupposes belief in God. “To found a moral people of God is therefore a 
task whose consummation can be worked for not from men but only from 
God himself”.17
Institutional belief, the Church, is indispensable for the introduction of 
moral religion. Kant expects that by virtue of the emerging Enlightenment, 
                                                                                                                       
13 Kant, Was heisst: Sich im Denken orientiren? (1786), Werke VIII, 146 footnote. (What is 
Orientation in Thinking? )
14 Die Religion, Werke VI, 6,97f. (Religion 89).
15 Werke VI, 94v. (Religion 87).
16 Werke VI, 100 (Religion 92).
17 Werke, VI, 100 (Religion 92).
9the church, which is forced to impose obligations on people, will be 
completely remodelled in his day.18 The aim is that everyone will obey moral 
law, which is the law of God and will unite all people in an ethical 
commonwealth.
2. Heirs of the Enlightenment? 
The Enlightenment as a movement is colourful, sometimes opposed to 
religion altogether, sometimes merely critical of it. If one poses the question 
of whether we, in the 21st century, wish to be heirs of the Enlightenment, 
then one should remember that Enlightenment is not a monolithic term. 
Generally this question receives a variety of answers, and this also applies to 
the authors of this volume. The fact is that the Western world was changed 
by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Political and social 
relations changed. The French Revolution was followed, in countries such as 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, by the separation of Church and 
State. From a political point of view, the Enlightenment was fruitful for the 
rise of democracy and human rights. In Western Europe, and other 
countries to which the Enlightenment emanated, such as the United States 
and Canada, there is religious freedom and free speech. In the political 
situation of today, Habermas and Derrida draw on the programme of the 
Enlightenment. They respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
with a plea for a new cosmopolitical order. They point to the Enlightenment 
ideals of world citizenship and cosmopolitical law as formulated in Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace. Their aim is a universal community in which all members 
have the right to “offer themselves to a community on the basis of the right 
of common possession of the surface of the earth”.19
I will point to various answers to the question of whether we wish to be 
the heirs of the Enlightenment. 
Critical public sphere and religion
Kant pleaded for the freedom of the theologian, as a scholar, to make public 
use of reason: “der öffentliche Gebrauch seiner Vernunft muss jederzeit 
frei sein, und der allein kann Aufklärung unter Menschen zu Stande 
                                      
18 Werke VI, 123 footnote.
19 G. Burradori, Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 2003, Preface.
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bringen”20 Public freedom stimulates the freedom of individuals since, 
according to Kant, every individual ‘by nature’ makes use of the opportunity 
to give his own judgement as soon as external circumstances allow.21
Enlightened philosophers in the eighteenth century resisted the traditional 
public sphere of the sovereign and the church with its constraints and 
authoritarian precepts. Enlightened members of civil society, first in 
England, and from the middle of the century in France and subsequently 
also in Germany, began to feel the need to express their opinion freely in 
matters of general interest such as morality and religion. They demanded a 
critical public sphere. Freedom of conscience and opinion should no longer 
need to be restricted to the private sphere, but should also be possible in 
public. In our own day, it is above all Habermas who has advocated a critical 
and historical reconstruction of the development of the public sphere in 
modern western democracies22. 
Herbert of Cherbury and the enlightened philosophers of the eighteenth 
century sought the solution for the peaceful coexistence of the different 
confessions in the recognition of a common basis, natural religion. This was 
only a partial solution, since belief generally remains within differing faith 
communities which are based on sacred writings and tradition. For this 
reason, enlightened philosophers also came up with the requirement for 
tolerance if different religious groups are to live together side by side. In this 
connection, Grube points to the importance of Lessing’s parable of the rings, 
in which he shows that the positive religions, such as Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, have only historical grounds for their claim to truth. This 
effectively wipes out the justification for belief, which was so characteristic 
for the Enlightenment itself: reason, with its natural or rational religion, is 
the very foundation of religion and the touchstone for evaluating religious 
belief. Only later developments in epistemology make possible the type of 
justification of faith which Grube wishes to highlight in the parable of the 
rings, due to the classical foundational thought of enlightened thinkers being 
replaced by a practice-oriented rationality.23 A justification of belief of this 
kind brings with it a willingness for inter-religious dialogue which only really 
                                      
20 Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung, Werke, VIII, 37.
21 Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung, Werke VIII,41. 
22 J.Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry  into a 
Category of the Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989; The Theory of 
Communicative Action, 2 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, 1987. 
23 Zie als voorbeeld hiervan Wessel Stoker, Is Faith Rational? A Hermeneutical-
Phenomenological Accounting for Faith, Peeters: Louvain 2006.   
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gained momentum after the development of ecumenism in the twentieth 
century.24      
Criticism: continuing the project of the Enlightenment?
Kant calls his time an age of criticism.25 The Enlightenment knows criticism 
in many forms. The legacy of eighteenth-century Deists, Anglican theologians 
(the Latitudinarians), and German Neologists, historical criticism has become 
part of academic theology today. 
In the Enlightenment, philosophy was frequently identified with 
criticism.26 The criticism of positive religion, with its ceremonies and rituals, 
at the hands of the proponents of moral religion was mentioned above. In 
their striving for a formal religion, Lessing and Kant did wish to retain 
something of positive religion. This project of the Enlightenment, the 
translation of religious notions into secular terms, or the ideal of a formal 
religion, is continued by Habermas and Derrida, as Kuipers and De Meyere
show. 
Hume, in his The Natural History of Religion (1757), draws a distinction 
between the foundation of natural religion in reason, on the one hand, and 
investigation into the causes of religious belief, on the other.27 In this way he 
criticizes Deists such as Tindal and Reimarus, for whom religion is 
simultaneously both reasonable, and proper to human nature. For after all, 
they believed that religion was as old as mankind. Hume disputes the notion 
that religion is characteristic of human nature, and explains religion as the 
result of passions present in human beings. Due to fear, for example, human 
beings affirm the existence of supernatural beings. Thus Hume would 
explain not only positive religion, but also natural religion, as a result of the 
force which passions exert on human beings. This is an example of a 
reductionist explanation of religion. The criticism is reductionist, since 
explaining religion in terms of human passions is in conflict with religion’s 
own self-image. In the later disciplines of the psychology and sociology of 
religion, reductionism, in the context of the theory of religion, has been the 
subject of a great deal of discussion. In the current volume, Beeckman and 
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Vintage Books 1968, ch.3. 
27 D.Hume,  The Natural History of Religion, ed.H.E. Root, London: Adam & Charles Black
1956, 21. Zie W. van Herck, De taak van de godsdienstfilosofie, Bijdragen, Tijdschrift voor 
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Thomas examine reductionism in the psychology and the sociology of 
religion. 
According to Kant, the maxim of always thinking for oneself is 
Enlightenment. Independent thought is only possible if one is aware of the 
limitations of reason. In the English Deists and Reimarus, a self-criticism of 
reason is lacking. In their epistemology, Locke, Hume and Kant furnish such 
self-criticism, each in their own way. For the philosophy of religion, in Kant’s 
view, self-criticism entails: “I had to remove knowledge, in order to make 
room for belief”.28 This raises the matter of whether it is possible to imagine 
belief without cognition. Depoortere discusses these problems in this volume, 
taking the example of the Czech philosopher Zizek. 
Alternatives for the Enlightenment, or beyond the Enlightenment
Heirs of the Enlightenment? Some of the articles in the volume show that the 
project of the Enlightenment is still in progress. Others give alternatives for 
the Enlightenment. In the eighteenth century there was already a movement 
which came to be known as the Counter-Enlightenment. In his article, Larjo
discusses Jacobi as an example of this school of thought. Authors such as 
Koistinen andVerbin give their own alternatives for aspects of enlightened 
though, whilst De Courten, Pratt and A.Vroom point to alternatives from 
beyond Western Europe: Eastern Orthodox and Buddhist thinking.   
The Enlightenment was strong in its programme of specific themes such 
as tolerance, the plea for a critical public sphere and independent thought as 
an expression of maturity. Its weaknesses lay, inter alia, in its vision of the 
human subject and its doctrine of God. Kant’s understanding of the 
phenomenon was also the subject of discussion in twentieth-century 
phenomenology. The current volume presents a new approach relating to the 
notion of the human being, the doctrine of God and the description of the 
phenomenon. It goes without saying that this is an approach which is new in 
comparison with Enlightenment philosophy. Naturally these new approaches 
are always tied in with later developments in theology and philosophy. A new 
approach to the concept of rationality is lacking in this volume. We can only 
conclude, with Richter, that ultimately the Enlightenment produced a fragile 
concept of reason. Postmodernism opposes enlightened foundational 
thinking. C.O. Schragg and J.J. Van Huyssteen seek a new concept of 
                                      
28 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), Werke III, 19.
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reason, beyond both foundational thinking itself and postmodern anti-
foundational thinking.29
Cartesian philosophy understands the human being ontologically as a 
spiritual substance. In his reflection on humanity, the empiricist Locke 
struggles with the concept of substance. Locke still retains the concept of 
substance in his notion of the human being, although it is at variance with 
his empiricism. Hume is more radical and rejects it. He understands the 
human being as a bundle of perceptions, which gives rise to the problem of 
how one should imagine human identity. Kant keeps to the transcendental 
subject which is common to all human beings. Welten shows, in the context 
of phenomenology, how one should imagine the interiority of the human 
being, whilst Jeanrond and Anderson present fresh approaches to the 
human subject using the phenomenon of love. 
The theologians and philosophers of the eighteenth century are not very 
innovative where the doctrine of God is concerned. Toland, Tindal and 
Reimarus operate with different ontologies, but concur in their 
understanding of God. They view God as the ideal type of the human being. 
God’s characteristics are idealized versions of human characteristics. Tindal 
writes, for example: “we then, …live the life of God; that is, we in our Place 
and Station, live after the same Manner, and by the same Rules as he does 
in his”.30 Kant rejects this Deist anthropomorphic discourse of God, which 
uncritically borrows predicates from human nature, and pleads instead for a 
symbolic discourse of God. We can give meaning to the concept of God, for 
example, by taking the relationship between a father and his children as a 
symbol of God’s relationship with mankind. This is an analogy which 
indicates the similarities between two relationships (analogia 
proportionalitatis).31 Later linguistic analysis and research into metaphor 
have made new progress for the discourse of God. Kant preserved the 
classical theistic discourse of God as almighty, all-knowing and all-good. In 
the twentieth century, Tillich and others corrected this idea of God. Kearney
presents a model for a post-onto-theological idea of God, as an alternative 
both to classical theism and postmodern, negative theologies. Boeve
furnishes interesting comment on this model. Schrijvers shows the 
                                      
29 C.O. Schrag, The Resources of Rationality; a Response to the Postmodern Challenge, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992, J. W. Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of 
Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science, Grand Rapids & Cambridge: 
W.B. Eerdmans 1999. W.Stoker, Is Faith Rational? ch. 6.2. 
30 Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 24.
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completely new approach of Marion, in the latter’s description of the 
phenomenon as ‘saturated’. In this, Marion wishes to act as a corrective not 
only to Kant’s description of the phenomenon, but also to that of Husserl 
and Heidegger.  
3. Scope and structure of the current volume 
Part one is devoted to a few highlights from the Enlightenment as a historical 
period and movement. Richter provides an overview of the Enlightenment as a 
period and movement. She emphasizes the diversity of the Enlightenment 
and presents four possible models for sub-dividing the period. She pays 
separate attention to Lessing and Kant. Grube shows that in his parable of 
the rings, Lessing gives a justification for faith which no longer claims to be 
universal. Judaism, Christianity and Islam give an internal justification of 
faith because they have only historical documents to legitimize themselves. 
For tolerance, then, one need not only point to the Deist natural religion and 
modern versions of this in Hick and Cantwell Smith. The religions which 
have grown up historically can also develop an attitude of tolerance, as 
Lessing demonstrates. 
Geldhof compares Lessing’s view of history with Schelling’s view of the 
ancient history of Judaism. He considers Schelling’s ‘historical philosophy’ 
more historical in approach than Lessing, who presents a philosophy of 
history which is divorced from the facts. Schaafsma discusses Jaspers’ 
interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil. Unlike Jaspers, Schaafsma 
believes that Kant presents a paradox, in that the individual is held 
responsible for evil, whereas at the same time evil is seen as a given of 
human nature. Larjo describes Jacobi as an example of the Counter-
Enlightenment. Jacobi dismisses Spinoza’s doctrine of freedom as fatalism 
which leads to nihilism. He views faith as part of knowledge, in this showing 
similarities with the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Jacobi is an anti-
foundational thinker, but should not, in Larjo’s view, be viewed as a 
postmodernist avant la lettre.
Part two concerns the continuation of the project of the Enlightenment. 
Beeckman discusses Freud’s theory of religion. Freud’s The Future of an 
Illusion (1927) stands in the tradition of Enlightenment criticism and is 
                                                                                                                       
31 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Werke V, par. 59 (Critique of Judgement). 
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strongly reductionist. Natural science is here the model for what knowledge 
is. Freud’s later book Moses and Monotheism (1939) has a different tone due 
to its more tempered reductionism, since science and religion are now not so 
sharply contrasted with one another. Truth and meaning are given a place in 
the interpretation of religion. Freud points to the importance of religion for 
cultural evolution. 
Thomas describes Durkheim, Weber and Luhmann’s sociology of 
religion as an Enlightenment project. They describe religion as a sociological 
phenomenon from a superior, privileged standpoint which is in conflict with 
religion’s self-image. To what extent can religion be translated into other 
terms? Thomas discusses the dilemma between a reductionist and non-
reductionist description of religion (Bellah and Eliade), and seeks a solution 
in an ‘operative realism’ which recognizes a limited possibility for the 
translation of religion. Any theoretical perspective is characterized by 
systematic uncertainty.   
Kuipers and De Meyere show that the interpretation of religion of the 
enlightened philosophers of religion finds its successors in Habermas and
Derrida. Lessing and Kant, for example, translated insights from Christian 
belief into general philosophical language, in this way arriving at a general 
concept of religion. Kuipers shows that Habermas does something similar. 
Habermas translates Jewish and Christian insights, such as the biblical 
notions of the covenant, forgiveness and atonement, into secular language. 
Just as Kant viewed Enlightenment as a process which was not yet 
complete, according to Habermas this is also true of secularization in our 
own day. By virtue of translating such religious insights into secular terms, 
reason becomes an ‘inclusive, solidarity-building force’. De Meyere examines 
to what extent Derrida reiterates Kant’s concept of religion. Like Kant, 
Derrida pleads for a formal religion, but he is more radical, in that he wishes 
to sever religion from its Jewish and Christian background. However, 
another reading of Derrida is also possible, in which religion does remain 
anchored in history. These two readings of Derrida are revealed to be two 
sides of the one coin. Both readings are determined by the predominance of 
the logos (reason/writing). De Meyere himself seeks a close association 
between religion and history. 
Depoortere shows how the philosopher S.Zizek, from Prague, links in 
with Kant’s obliteration of knowledge to make way for belief. The status of 
faith (as trust) and its content (belief) in a so-called post-Enlightenment age 
is examined in the example of Zizek. Can we speak of ‘faith as trust without 
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its content, belief’? Zizek suggests the hypothesis of a primordial choice, 
which explains adherence to a certain faith tradition. The believer discovers 
that he has already always chosen to believe. This is the only way, according 
to Depoortere, to retain the critical element of the Enlightenment and to 
avoid both postmodern relativism and fundamentalism.                
Part three gives alternatives for the Enlightenment. The first section concerns 
alternatives from Western theology and philosophy, and the second section 
alternatives from Russian Orthodox thought and Buddhism.
Koistinen raises the debate about realism in reaction to the universality 
of enlightened reason, and pleads for ‘meaning finitism’. The meaning of 
words is learned in the light of a finite number of examples which are 
different for different people. The alternative to an a-historical reality in 
matters of religion, or to a Deist understanding of meaning, is not religion as 
a social construct (Durkheim), but a ‘minimal theological realism’, in which
theological terms and knowledge are context-dependent. Verbin points to the 
use of imagination in Bible stories. Faith should not be understood as a 
species of a historical, scientific, or metaphysical belief. She wishes to avoid 
not only Lessing’s problem of religion and history, but also the discussion 
about proofs of God’s existence, in which faith is understood as a sort of 
belief. Verbin pleads for faith as participation in a biblical world of fiction, by 
means of imagining the various events, instead of viewing the stories in the 
Bible as history. 
De Courten and Pratt introduce Russian alternatives to enlightened 
thought, and A. Vroom looks at an alternative from the Buddhist tradition. 
De Courten discusses Slovyov’s ambition to make religion the core of life. His 
thinking certainly embraces enlightened themes such as religious freedom, 
progress and criticism of dogma. However, the fundamental principle behind 
his thinking ultimately turns out not to be Enlightenment in the secular 
sense, but rather in the religious sense of divine wisdom (sophia). Pratt, in 
his article, discusses the alternative to enlightened reason put forward by 
the Russian theologian Florensky, who was executed in 1937 by the 
Communist authorities. As an alternative to the enlightened concept of 
reason, Florensky proffers his vision of absolute knowledge understood as a 
series of steps, perspectives and movements  which manifest themselves 
simultaneously. This can only be expressed in spatial metaphors. A.Vroom 
shows how Hisimatsu Shin’ichi, a philosopher and practictioner of Zen, 
criticizes the Western understanding of rationality because it stands in the 
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way of an open attitude towards reality. Living rationally causes suffering 
because our thoughts and theories prevent us from seeing things as they 
really are and as we ourselves are. What is striking is that Hisimatsu 
Shin’ichi does nevertheless speak strongly in favour of independent thought, 
the theme of the Enlightenment. Is this a contradiction? 
Part four represents a new departure for the philosophy of religion, compared 
with the philosophy of the Englightenment, in its thinking about human 
beings, God, and the description of phenomena. Welten shows that the 
French phenomenologist Michel Henry puts forward a view of the human 
subject which does justice to the interiority of the human being, the spiritual 
space in which he or she seeks God. Henry builds on Kandinsky’s insights 
regarding colours and forms which do not merely refer to the exterior world, 
but also manifest something of that which is invisible, the immediate 
continuance of life. In this way, in his phenomenology of the human subject, 
Henry explains human interiority as interiority, and not as the result of 
relations with the external world. 
Anderson searches for the correct notion of the self in love relationships. 
This cannot be a neutral self, but equally not a self-sacrificing self. In love, 
one must always postulate a loving self. Selflessness in love (the absence of 
self-seeking) is thus not a matter of liberation from oneself, but rather of 
being ‘oneself as an other’ (Ricoeur). Anderson attempts to develop a correct 
notion of self by drawing on Weil and Murdoch. Jeanrond, in his Christian 
theology of love, also rejects self-less love. The emphasis in St John’s Gospel 
on love for one’s own group should be supplemented by St Paul’s 
understanding of love as respecting the otherness of the other with patience 
and affection, and St Luke’s stress on a love which encompasses all human 
beings, regardless of status or race. Further, Jeanrond posits that love 
should constitute the new framework for the discourse of the human self, 
rather than the self as the framework for the discourse of love. Even more 
than Brümmer and Marion, Jeanrond wishes to emphasize the importance of 
the body. The experience of true love is simultaneously the starting point for 
religious experience. The true experience of love has the potential to open the 
self through and to the otherness of the other, and the otherness of the self. 
For after all, does not the experience of otherness contain the possibility of 
being confronted with God’s radical otherness?     
Schrijvers analyses the concept of the saturated phenomenon in the 
writings of Marion. In this way, the miracle is reintroduced into philosophy, 
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albeit understood differently from in discussions at the time of the 
Enlightenment. Schrijvers examines whether Marion’s phenomenology does 
perhaps remain indebted to metaphysics.    
In his ‘poetics of the possible God’, Kearney posits a ‘God who may be’ 
as an alternative to the classical theistic, almighty God ‘who is’.  He pleads 
for the priority of the possible above the real. The Kingdom of God is not 
about domination and omnipotence, but about small things, as is 
demonstrated by Jesus’ parable of the mustard seed. Thus an eschatological 
God of promise and of powerlessness is depicted, and this emphasizes 
human responsibility for the realization of the Kingdom of God. The ‘wager’ 
that God should be experienced as a possibility to come is backed up with 
passages from Scripture, examples from the Western philosophical tradition, 
and quotations from poets such as Musil and Rilke. Boeve responds with a 
commentary on Kearney’s model of a post-onto-theological God. He 
compares Kearney’s contribution with those of postmodern philosophers 
such as Derrida and Caputo, especially where Derrida points to the 
structure of the Messianic. Kearney opts for a hermeneutic approach to 
religion, and takes the analysis of traditional texts as his starting point. 
Boeve agrees with this hermeneutics of particularity, highlighting the 
particular historical event of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. 
Prof. dr. Wessel Stoker teaches philosophy of religion and aesthetics at the 
Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam
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